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41. Preface
This report describes the results of the Specialist Meeting of the National Center for Geographic
Information and Analysis (NCGIA) on the topic of “The Ontology of Fields. ” The meeting was held
in Bar Harbor, Maine, June 11-13, 1998. The main purpose of the meeting was to examine the
ontology and conceptualizations of geographic phenomena in terms of spatially continuous fields. The
concept of field is widely used in a variety of scientific contexts, most notably in mathematical
physics, and many geographically distributed variables (e.g., elevation and temperature) are
conceptualized as single-valued functions of location.
Some of the questions discussed during the meeting were: What is the ontology of fields? Is
human cognition less accommodating to field conceptions than to object-based conceptions? What
are the interrelationships between object and field types of representations in human cognition? How
can the cognitive interrelationships between these two types of representation be ope ation lized, and
how can field representations be accommodated within contemporary paradigms of computing? How
are the representations of the mathematical modeling communities in various domains to be related
to cognitive categorizations? What options exist for representing uncertainty and indeterminacy in
fields, and are they meaningful from a cognitive perspective?
This Report on the Specialist Mee ing serves to document some of the answers to these questions
and some of the discussions held during the meeting. It includes also a set of researchable questions,
which arose during these discussions.
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3. Introduction
3.1 The Project “The Ontology of Fields”
The Ontology of Fields venture is a project under the research area Geographic Information and
Analysis identified by the National Science Foundation in the late 1980s when the National Center
for Geographic Information and Analysis (NCGIA) was established. Under the NCGIA’s Varenius
project (http://www.ncgia.org/varenius), Ontology of Fields is one of three specialist meetings held
under the panel on Computational Implementations of Geographic Concepts (Panel Chair: Max
Egenhofer, University of Maine). Geographic information science is the research field that attempts
to formalize geographic concepts and their use, particularly within a computing context. Geographic
concepts are the primitive units of all cognitive operations relating to geographic space. In the original
project description, geographic concepts were divided into three groups: First, there is the group of
common-sense geographic concepts which are the concepts that people use in everyday life, such as
valley, lake, pond, uphill, leeward, and so forth. Second, there is the group of abstract spatial
concepts which are derived from mathematical formalization. These include concepts pertaining to
6coordinate systems (e.g., Cartesian coordinates), and to cartographic projections. Third, there is the
group of concepts used by the various sciences that are concerned with geographic phenomena,
concepts such as nearest neighbor, gravity model, trend surface.
Geographic concepts apply to entities of different kinds. Some concepts apply to entities that are
very different from common-sense objects, entities—for example population density—tha  are
themselves in fact more like concepts, in that they may have no material substance. Although
population density within a given area is not directly perceivable, one might still argue that it is in fact
an entity with a real-world existence just as the individuals contributing to it have real-world
existence. But one may also have reasons for claiming that population density is a mere mathematical
abstraction, and that only the individuals themselves are real.
The problem with concepts like that of population density is that the entity to which it applies is
a field-like entity rather than an object-like entity. Thus, the population density at a point is not
univocally determined: it varies in systematic ways according to our demarcation of the area in
relation to which it is measured. Many geographic concepts apply to such field-like entities. Now field
is a well-established concept within the realm of physics, where we find entities like gravitational
fields, electro-magnetic fields and so forth. But it is less clear what a field in geographic space might
be. What exactly is required in order for something to be a field? Are there different kinds of fields?
How do we think about concepts that apply to field-like entities and how can we represent and
explain these concepts through the application of appropriate methods of analyses? These questions
can be collected under the same heading as questions concerning the ontology of fields; i.e., the
nature of fields.
In order to advance research on the ontology of fields the NCGIA organized a three-day
Specialist Meeting, a workshop intended to illuminate the nature of fields and to identify researchable
questions on the topic.
The background paper for this meeting was the paper Ontology and Geographic Kinds presented
by Barry Smith and David M. Mark at the International Symposium on Spatial Data Handling
(SDH ’ 98) in Vancouver, Canada 12-15 July, 1998, an abstract of which is included in Appendix II
below. Here, an attempt is taken to develop an ont logy of geographic kinds, that is, of the categories
or entity types in the domain of geographic objects in order to arrive at a better understanding of the
7structure of the geographic world. While we know intuitively that there is some objective reality that
contains what we might call bona fide objects, such as islands, rivers, lakes and roads, Smith and
Mark argue that human geographic reality includes also objects that exist only in virtue of our
individual and social conceptualizations of the relevant areas of space; they are objects; objects
delineated though human reasoning and language. These are called fiat-objects. While some fiat
objects such as countries and census tracts approximate to the status of concrete things that occupy
pieces of land on the surface of the Earth and have discrete boundaries, there are also more abstract
fiat objects such as areas defined by specific soil or vegetation type. Fiat objects may in fact in many
cases be much more field than object-like. But the question still remains as to what the nature of such
field-like entities is, and how we are to think about and conceptualize them.
To develop a better understanding of categories or types of geographic objects, it must always
be remembered that all entities can be viewed as field or object-like for specific purposes. To this
degree making a listing of entities according to whether they are field- or object-like is a futile
exercise. This division of reality into objects and fields is an ongoing process of construction for every
science and for every individual as we continuously learn about the complex interworkings of our
environment. We also change our perspective or world view to suit the particular context or level of
knowledge. Thus, we may view vegetation cover as a continuous field over space, or as consisting
of discrete objects such as meadows and stands of forest.
The remainder of this report reviews the talks and a selection of the group discussions on this
topic. It is hoped that readers of this report will get an insight into the ontology of fields. It is
furthermore hoped that the report will function as a guide for future research within the area. More
information can be found on the Web at http://bbq.ncgia.ucsb.edu:80/~vanzuyle/varenius/
ontology.html
3.2 Note on the Origin of the Field Concept
Before turning to the discussion of what a geographic field is and how the concept of field is used in
geography it might be worthwhile to take a brief look at the origin of the field concept.
The idea goes back to the ancient Greek thinkers, who became interested in the divisibility of
matter and space. Anaxagoras introduced the concept of infinite divisibility into natural philosophy.
This thesis served as the basis of early Greek thinking on the mathematics of the continuum and is the
8foundation of the scientific doctrine of continuous space. A differing vein of thought that developed
from this was tomism, which reduced everything to infinitely separable (and separate) particles—
bodies adrift in space, with space itself (the void) as the container of these objects. Atomism has
earlier roots in Pythagoreanism. The Pythagoreans thought of the cosmos as a harmonious unity of
such basic opposites as the limit and the unlimited. This represents the origins of the notion that space
has two aspects: on the one hand as the Void and infinite, as a box-like receptacle of objects; on he
other hand, as the order of spatial relations of these objects.
Aristotle rejected the notion of atoms and the Void. Instead, he developed his famous conception
of space as topos, that is, space as an order of places. According to Aristotle, place exists together
with objects, and all objects are located in some place. Place thereby becomes a necessary condition
for the existence of any object. Space is, on this view, continuous and never empty.
The introduction of the concept of field into contemporary science in the middle of the nineteenth
century by the British scientist Michael Faraday was something like a revolution in scientific thinking.
Until that time it was generally accepted that the most fundamental level of reality was composed of
material things or particles each having a particular location at any given time. Such particles were
believed to be capable of moving under their own intrinsic energy or under the influence of other
particles. What we today often think of as a gravity field was before Faraday thought to be a force
exerted by an element on another element; that is, action at a distance.
When Faraday introduced the field concept he also asserted that the thesis according to which the
most fundamental level of reality is composed only of material things is wrong. Some of the most
fundamental constituents of reality, he claimed, have none of the properties possessed by particles:
they do not have an exact location at a given time, they do not move and they are not forced to move
by the interaction with other entities. These fundamental constituents were called field.
The introduction of the concept of fields, in fact, began with an experimental discovery made by
the Danish physicist H. C. Ørsted who observed that a straight wire conducting electrical current in
one direction could turn a compass needle that was placed in directions perpendicular to the direction
of current flow. Faraday interpreted Ø st ’ s result in terms of a single electromagnetic field in which
the magnetic component is an electric field in motion.
9An electromagnetic field is an entity that fills all of space in a continuous fashion without moving
from one point to another. Such a field can also be described as an electromagnetic wave, but the
latter metaphor is rather misleading to the extent that waves in the literal sense (for example ocean
waves) presuppose more fundamental entities, namely water-molecules, they are vibrations of water
that propagate from one place to another. When the electromagnetic field was discovered, it was
believed that electromagnetism could be understood as vibrations in a plenum, but vibrations that
propagate instantaneously, that is, with an infinite velocity.
Faraday also argued that all forces should be described in terms of fields. Newton’ s universal
gravitational force was thus to be understood not as a force exerted by a body on another body, but
rather as a field created by and stretching between two bodies. This view is, of course, incompatible
with the older scientific view that all physical phenomena depend, fundamentally, on the configuration
of forces which reflect the impact of particles of matter on each other. According to Faraday, at least,
electricity and magnetism were to be understood, not as bits of matter, but as continuous fields.
Electric charges can influence other electric charges because they are manifested in terms of fields of
influence which extent continuously through all of space and time.
For further information on the field concept, see Sachs 1973.
4. Barry Smith: An Introduction to Ontology
4.1 Formal Ontology, Material Ontology
Ever since the Greek philosopher Aristotle, ontology has served as a basis for our theories and
construction of models. But what is ontology? Why do we need to think about an ontology within
the context of geographic information science? An ontology is either an abstraction of the formal
features that characterize all scientific areas, or it is a statement of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for something to be a particular kind of entity within a given domain. The ontology of law,
for example, is a description of the necessary and sufficient criteria for something to be law or to be
a legal object. The first kind of ontology is called formal ontology, while the second kind is called
material ontology. Formal ontology, in contrast to material ontology, does not study the phenomena
of a specific institutional, social or natural domain. Rather, formal ontology is like mathematics. All
sciences, such as biology, chemistry, physics and so forth, presuppose mathematics. Scientists cannot
10
carry out their experimental research without presupposing mathematics. Formal ontology is like
mathematics, that is, the study of the structures that are shared between the different scientific
domains. It is the study of identity and difference, of unity and plurality, of properties and relations,
of part and whole, of measure and quantity. Much of ontology is very simple (for example that
identity is transitive). Hence it has not been studied in systematic ways to the degree that mathematics
has been studied.
Ontology as traditionally conceived is not a description of how we conceptualize the world, but
rather a description of the world itself. This, of course, assumes that there is only one true reality to
be described. If ontology were based on conceptualizations, then we would have as many proper
ontologies as there are conceptualizations. But to say that ontology is a description of true reality is
not the same as to say that we cannot recognize a distinction between good and bad work in
ontology. There is, however, no easy way of judging whether a given ontological proposal is a good
or bad one. But there are some criteria for this judgment. For instance, an ontological proposal or
hypothesis that is incompatible with physics is ipso facto a bad one. This is, of course, a weak
criterion. Ontology does not have to be in complete correspondence with physics, but it should not
be incompatible with it.
I have already talked about the analogy between ontology and mathematics. Let me extend this
analogy a little further. If we based mathematics on what people in different cultures think, we would
end up having a number of different mathematical theories. But they cannot all be true. Some of them
are closer to the truth than others. Hopefully, the mathematical and ontological theories developed
by different groups of people in different cultures will eventually converge to single true theories. It
may take a very long time before we can be satisfied that such convergence has been achieved.
With this extended analogy between mathematics and ontology we have moved over to the question
of epistemology. Ontology in itself does not presuppose epistemology; in fact, it is completely
independent of our knowledge of the world in the following sense: what we can or cannot know
about X at any given stage has no implications for the ontology of X (for the properties of X, the
relations in which it stands). That the relation of part to whole is transitive holds true independently
of whether any cognitive agent knows this or any other truth, and it is independent also of how
knowledge is gained or evaluated. Yet the evaluation of ontological proposals touches upon
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epistemology. We cannot know what the world is like via any simple method. We can only gradually
move closer to the truth. But the comparison of ontological proposals requires a specific form of
knowledge, namely knowledge of the world of the sort that is provided by science, and also by
common-sense experience.
Consider the following figure:
Within the shaded circle we have the domain of objects with which we are concerned. Above this
circle we have various theories and beliefs, together with the corresponding models of the domain
of objects in which we are interested. With the development of our knowledge, we can hope that
these models will converge on each other, and that they will come more and more to resemble the
world itself. That this is not an unreasonable hope is shown by the high degree of successful
interaction between and cooperation among existing theories and beliefs.
Theories that are correct descriptions of a given domain of objects allow us to infer the material
ontology for that domain. By investigating what is shared by all material ontologies we can infer the
principles of formal ontology.
In the specific case of geography, the real world consists on the one hand of physical geographic
features (bona fide objects). On the other hand, there are the various fiat objects, for example legal
and administrative objects, including parcels of real estate, areas of given soil types, census tracts, and
so on, each of which coincides at any given time with a certain portion of the entire physical surface












types of objects mentioned, also people, their beliefs and their actions (for example, the actions of
those who work in land registries or in census bur aux). Once we have understood the basic entities
of ontology we can begin to look at how, for example, people relate to both fiat and bona fide objects
in the areas that concern them. These relations, too, will then form part of the ontology. The
ontologist is interested in the world, including those portions of the world that are created or
constructed by the people in it. He is interested also in the beliefs (both true and false) people have
about the objects in the world.
4.2 Applied Ontology, Referent-Based Ontology and Elicited Ontologies
Nowadays ontology is being put to use also for a variety of practical purposes, so that one might
speak of something like ‘applied ontology’. What purposes can ontology serve within the context of
information science in general and within geographic information science in particular? Some answers
to these questions are provided by the recent volume edited by Nicola Guarino (1998) of LADSEB-
CNR in Padua. This volume contains papers by philosophers on the one hand and by information
scientists on the other hand demonstrating the ways in which ontological ideas are increasingly being
put to use for example in the construction of software tools for merging large databases, in facilitating
database integration within a single enterprise (enterprise integration), in conceptual modelling a d
information systems design, in the design of software for multi-lingual information retrieval and
extraction, in the construction of systems for electronic commerce, and in a variety of other areas,
including geographic information science (Frank 1997). In each of these fields it has proved fruitful
to develop common ontologies in terms of which divergent bodies of data derived from different
sources can be unified together into a single system. Ontological engineering of this sort was
pioneered in the ARPA Knowledge Sharing Initiative and in the work of Tom Gruber (1993) and his
colleagues on the Knowledge Interchange Project in Stanford.
Unfortunately, however, philosophers and information scientists have different conceptions of
what ontology is, and these conceptions may indeed appear incompatible. Above all, ontology on the
philosopher’s understanding is the science of being, or the science of what is, of the types of entities
making up reality. On this understanding to talk of a plurality of ontologies in the manner which has
become common among information scientists is a solecism (analogous to the solecism which would
be involved in referring to different biologies, rather than to different branches of biology).
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Some clarification can be gained on this front if we make a terminological distinction between
referent- or reality-based (hereafter R-) ontologies on the one hand, and elicited or epistemological
(hereafter E-) ontologies on the other. An R-ontology is a theory about how a given referent-domain
(which might be the whole universe) is structured, what sorts of entities it contains, what sorts of
relations obtain between these entities, and so on. An E-ontology, in contrast, is a theory about how
a given individual or group or language or science conceptualizes a given domain, a theory of the
ontological content of certain representations. The practitioner of R-ontology is concerned with
principles that are true of reality. The practitioner of E-ontology elicits principles from subjects (or
theories, or systems) by a process which might be called ontology-mining. The elicited principles may
or may not be true; their significance lies elsewhere—for instance in yielding a correct account of the
taxonomical system used by experts in a given domain, for example by the designers of a geographic
information system. There are as many proper E-ontologies as there are conceptualizations.
An R-ontology is not a description of how we conceptualize the world, but rather a description
of the world itself. This, of course, assumes that there is only one reality to be described. To develop
ontology as a description of reality is not a trivial exercise. Ontology so conceived must be compatible
with physics and with other developed sciences. All branches of R-ontology (all R-ontologies of
specific sub-domains) should be compatible with each other, and R-ontology in toto should contain
the resources to account for the relations between the objects treated of in each of these branches.
To the extent that incompatibilities remain between different branches of R-ontology, corrections to
one or other of the disciplines involved are still required.
The analogy introduced above between ontology and mathematics can be extended somewhat
further in order to throw light on the claim, popular in some circles, to the effect that the very idea
of an R-ontology is misconceived because it presupposes some sort of God’s eye perspective which
would be independent of all specific human points of view (and thus of all specific E-ontologies) and
thus simply true. To see what is wrong with this argument imagine how it would look if applied to
the case of mathematics. It would amount to the proposal that mathematics be reduced to
ethnomathematics. Mathematics would be based on what people in different cultures think of
numbers, geometrical figures, and so on. We would end up with a spectrum of different mathematical
theories, no one of which could be held to be more or less true than any other (since to accept such
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an evaluation would be to commit oneself once more to the existence of some God’s eye
perspective).
With these remarks we have moved once again into the realm of epistemology. We can now say
more precisely that the evaluation of competing proposals as to the proper concent of R-ontology
touches upon epistemological issues. We cannot know what the world is like by some simple and easy
method. At best we can only move gradually closer to the truth via an incremental process of theory-
construction, criticism and testing, and amendment.
5. Geoffrey Jacquez: Spatial Statistics. Talking about Talking about Spatial Data
5.1 Motivation
Recently I ha ve had discussions with Susan Maruca (who is running a project at BioMedware to
develop software for the analysis of geographic boundaries) on the topic: Are boundaries present in
continuous spatial fields? Related questions include: Within a given field, are there boundaries that
are more significant than others? and: How can we determine which boundaries are the most
significant? A statistical null model that is often used for the assessing the significance of spatial
statistics is Complete Spatial Randomness (CSR). However, this model may not be appropriate for
boundaries, where spatial pattern (such as spatial autocorrelation) may be expected even in the
absence of boundary-generating phenomena. Boundaries in the natural world, for example ec tones,
reflect underlying space-time processes such as natural selection, inter- and intra-specific competition
and so on. It seems reasonable to suppose that boundary characteristics may be caused by, or at least
related to, the space-time processes that gave rise to them. Similarly, the signatu e (e.g.,
correlogram) of any spatial statistic may provide clues to the space-time processes that generated the
spatial field. We can think of any spatial statistic as being sensitive to specific features or objects
(patterns) on spatial fields. This suggests that a proper ontology would answer the question of what
features on a spatial field are meaningful (have the most information content) for increasing our
understanding of the underlying space-time processes. Here, I shall focus on the problem of what
significant means in the context of features/objects on spatial fields.
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5.2 Representing Data
In spatial statistics we use the term spatial response surface. This represents the notion of spatial
variation through geographic space. An everyday analog of the spatial response surface is
topography. What is the vocabulary we use to describe topography? We use words like peak,
plateau, valley, saddle, etc. Such words describe objects that are part of our ontology, and they are
used to describe features in our everyday world that are meaningful. In addition, these features have
large information content in terms of the geological processes that gave rise to them. The U- haped
valley was gouged by a glacier, the plateau is an igneous intrusion, and so on. When working with
spatial response surfaces, the concept meaningful features essentially degenerates to the kinds of
patterns (signatures) our arsenal of spatial statistical tools can detect. So the current ontology implicit
in spatial statistics is something of an artifact, emergent from the signatures that can be distinguished
via spatial statistics. A proper ontology would, rather, define features on spatial fields that are
meaningful to our understanding of underlying space-time processes. We then could design spatial
statistics whose signatures are sensitive to those features.
5.3 Vocabulary
Consider the kind of stuff we call snow. In English we have but one single substantive for snow, but
we can, of course, qualify it in various ways in order to describe several snow phenomena granular
snow, melted refrozen snow, etc. Similarly, when we represent geographic data we can pick out a
phenomenon and describe it by a single term or we can describe it in more detail.
5.4 Methods
In the 1990s we have various words describing features on spatial response surfaces, depending on
the spatial statistical technique: Spatial autocorrelation tests lead us to speak of positive spatial
autocorrelation, complete spatial randomness, and negative spatial autocorrelation. Words used
in boundary analysis include f zzy boundaries, crisp boundaries, open boundaries and closed
boundaries. The field of cluster analysis speaks of general clustering and focused clusters. These
words describe the kinds of patterns that can be detected by specific statistical tests. But are they
useful for describing those features with high information content?
16
5.5 Fundamental Problem
The fundamental problem of data representation is that of inferring past processes from observed
spatial data. We typically work with spatial data representative of one or a few snap sh ts in time.
Typically, the time frame of space-time processes is much longer than our observational time scale.
Rarely, if ever, are we able to watch a spatial response surface evolve as its determining forces are
at work.
5.6 Analytic Approaches
In general analytical approaches may be divided into (1) models of process, (2) models of data, and
(3) exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA). Models of process are expressed in terms of the
biological and physical parameters of the system under study. For xample, a compartmental model
of a structured population whose coefficients describe migration between subpopulations. I addition
to the data, a model of process requires sufficient knowledge to model the system in a meaningful
fashion. Models of data are expressed in terms of relationships among the observed data. For
example, the slope and intercept in a regression model are useful for prediction but do not necessarily
convey any information regarding the system’ s basic physical and biological mechanisms. In addition
to the available data, constructing a model of data requires selection of a statistical model (e.g.,
regression and ANOVA)—detailed knowledge of the mechanics of the system is not needed. ESDA
seeks to identify patterns in the data that may suggest and eventually lead to a model of data or even
to a model of process. It requires the available data and tools (e.g., spatial statistics) for pattern
identification.
5.7 Methods for Identifying Patterns
The objective, then, is to identify spatial patterns. There are a number of components of statistical
inference for identifying patterns within spatial data:
• Test statistic
• Null spatial model




• Alternative spatial model
The test statistic is a number that summarizes an aspect of the data that is of scientific interest.
The null model describes the space-time distribution of the variable(s) expected when the null
hypothesis is true, it defines the null distribution (defined below) of the proposed test statistic. The
null distribution of the test statistic is obtained either theoretically or empirically through Monte
Carlo simulation. Both the theoretical derivation and the randomization procedure must be consistent
with the null model. Probability values under the null hypothesis are obtained by comparing the value
of the test statistic to the null distribution. The null hypothesis is usually stated in terms of parameters
of the null model. The observed value of the test statistic is compared to the null distribution arising
under the null model. The alternative hypothesis is stated in terms of parameters of the null model
or in terms of additional parameters used in constructing the alternative model. The alternative model
may be an omnibus not the null model or a more specific model describing spatial pattern.
5.8 Summary
The objective of spatial field analysis is the inference of space-time processes. Spatial statistics is
concerned with (a) quantifying spatial patterns and (b) determining whether or not a pattern is
unusual. To be useful to scientific inference an ontology must: (a) be descriptive of spatial structures,
that is, of the patterns expected under relevant space-time processes, and (b) include quantifiable
objects useful for purposes of spatial statistical inference.
6. Brandon Plewe: Data Modeling, GIS Integration, Vagueness
6.1 Fields in Data Modeling
In thinking about how fields relate to spatial databases, I adopted a standard database modeling
approach. This, under various different terms, consists of going from reality to some kind of
conceptual model (i.e., thinking about whatever it is we are trying to model), from there down to a
logical data model (a general strategy for the data organization), and from there down to the actual
data structures, where we have specified exactly how we are going to structure and organize the
information once we get it.
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How does this relate to the ontology of fields? I will start with reality. I am not exactly going to
specify what reality is. Reality is something; I am not sure what. As to conceptual models of this
reality, we can distinguish four conceptual models of space:
• The plenum is something that fills space, such as water or air. It may be a real phenomenon
or an ideal space. You can measure various properties at any point. Water will have several
variables, while population density only has one.
• The plenum can be divided into regions to form what we call a categorical coverage. The
boundaries of these regions are determined from the data. You should think of it as a matter
of regions that have been defined by some kind of data.
• The third model is the hard partition, that is, a partition where the boundaries are officially
set. They may or may not originally have been the result of real properties of space. An
example of this is the boundaries of countries. Another example is the set of census tracts,
where the city has been carved up into areas long before the data was collected. These two
categories look very similar. If you look at a map with no descriptions it would be difficult
to tell the difference. The difference is in the source and meaningof the regions, not in their
appearance.
• The fourth model is the object or entity view. Objects are here thought of as existing in their
own right. Think of Africa cut up into countries. You are here thinking of each country as a
lone unit without thinking of how the boundaries were created and without any supposition
to the effect that it is only part of the overall continent.
This is not necessarily the way reality is, but these models are ways we commonly think about
reality. We may look at the same thing (say, vegetation cover) and see any of the four models. The
entities in the fourth model are more object-like; those in the first category are more field-like.
The more object-like formal representations or data models are based on models of the fourth
kind, while the more field-like representations are based on models of the first kind. The vector data
model is based on the strategy of extracting the geometric properties of individual entities (and is thus
more object-like). The raster idea is one according to which you break up space into rectangular or
square bits and pieces that are equally distributed and you sample information pertaining to each
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piece, or you make an average. In this way continuous fields are made discrete. The two intermediate
conceptual models will usually have to be remodeled either as objects or fields.
Vector, object-based GIS is more popular than raster, field-based GIS in the GIS industry. This
is because there are some important limitations of raster. Thinking of GIS in terms of fields is not as
common as thinking of it in terms of discrete entities. This is not because of differences in their
respective powers of analysis. The capabilities of raster in this regard are at least as strong as vector.
Although there are many things that we cannot yet do. Still, there is a lot we can do with raster GIS.
Data entry has been more difficult in the past, but we now have data entry sources that make it easier,
such as satellite imagery and softcopy phot grametry. Does the problem lie with the subject-matter?
Many of the types of GIS subject-matter which have driven the industry, for example urban modeling,
have a more object-like character. But a business market area is an example of a subj ct- atter that
is more field-like. Perhaps, then, the reason for preferring vector to raster is a matter of
comprehension—that we have a more difficult time understanding and communicating about fields.
6.2 GIS Integration
One of the crucial issues in GIS and in the study of spatial databases today is that of integr tion. We
can think specifically about the integration of raster and vector. Currently, if you want to integrate
objects and fields, then you have to convert the one into the other in order to compare them. But this
may not be a good way of doing things; we lose something in the translation.
An important emerging trend is the integration of GIS with database management systems
designed to allow you to combine your spatial information with the rest of the information in your
enterprise. Traditionally this has been much easier to do with vector than with raster, since most
common vector data structures are themselves essentially relational databases. We also want to tie
GIS information into other kinds of scientific models.
But can we solve these problems? Can we just take existing data structures and somehow do
better processing? Or do we need better data models or better data structures? I do not know. Here
are some of the properties the solutions should have.
• One is that it should have a data structure that is capable of integrating both field- and object-
type information. We have talked about this for years. Donna Peuquet wrote a paper about
it over ten years ago (Peuquet, 1988).
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• We would also like to have operations that can integrate data of various types. It would be
nice to be able to take field data, say pertaining to the atmosphere, and combine it with
object-like data, such as data pertaining to the boundaries of cities. In that case we would not
have to convert one into the other.
• The last thing has to do with comprehension. It would be nice if we could have some data
model that could preserve the detail that is available in fields, e.g., the temperature in the
atmosphere, but yet still enjoy the comprehensibility possessed by data-models based on
objects. Perhaps the answer for these last two properties is some kind of multiple
representation, where we represent something in two forms at the same time. However, the
difficulties of doing this utilizing a traditional raster-vector view of geographic data
representation were also documented by Peuquet (1988).
6.3 Vagueness, Indeterminacy, Gradients (Fuzziness)
Rather than speaking of fuzziness or vagueness, I prefer to talk in terms of gradation. The idea is that
you have something that has gradual rather than crisp boundaries. If I have a region, then there is a
core area that definitely is in that region. Then I have a boundary that is actually an area or zone of
gradual change rather than a line. Finally, there is the ext rior,which is definitely not part of the
region.
Such graded regions exist not only in real geographic space but also in the thematic dimension.
Think of the concept ho. There are certain temperatures that are definitely “hot,” others that are not.
In between there is a range of temperatures in the area of gradation. There is also a temporal
dimension of gradation, where there is a gradual change within a region extended over time.
The theory of fuzzy sets can be used to model this phenomenon and hence it is often referred to
as fuzziness. The problem is that in common usage (i.e., outside of fuzzy set theory) fuzzy is a much
broader term and has unfortunate connotations. Vague is an ambiguous term, too. Gradation is a
better term to describe the phenomenon we have in mind.
Let us talk about gradation and uncertainty. Gradation is not a question of uncertainty, even
though they often look similar when represented or conceptualized. Uncertainty lies in measurement
and observation, while gradation is inherent in an entity itself. Uncertainty just means that I do not
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know where a given boundary is, only that it is somewhere (somewhere determinate) within a certain
area; gradation means that the boundary itself really is an area.
Uncertainty arises as we measure reality and force it to conform to our data base. But what
causes gradation? For my dissertation, I looked at some twenty-five examples of gradation, but I was
not able to find it in the real world. Where I did find gradation was within things that we might call
conceptual entities. I thus argue that gradation arises when we think about reality and conceptualize
it. A problem arises as we try to simplify reality in order to comprehend it.
For example, suppose I have a field of population density, which I created from a large number
of objects (i.e., people). I want to use that field to determine the boundaries of a metropolitan area
(an object). One criterion for a metropolitan area is that of high population density. High is a gradual
term. I apply it to the area where the density is higher than a given value and call that area urban. I
can do that, but it is problematic, because over-simplification is involved.
The problems inherent in such transfer between conceptual models are important because this is
not an isolated phenomenon: we spend a lot of time moving between different models. Take the
example of population density. I start by thinking of people in terms of population density and then
I want to go back to a city or an urban area. All kinds of problems then arise. It appears that the
conceptual objects we artificially create out of fields often involve gradation, for example, a hill,
which is created from elevation. Think also of soil; it does not change at a line, but when we talk
about it and represent it, we are forced to create crisp, line-like boundaries.
A lot of research could be done on this kind of switching between conceptual models. Are there
situations where we can avoid it? In the past we have avoided it by creating crisp boundaries, but then
we are just creating a problem. Perhaps the idea of integrated object-field data models will be a
solution to the problem of vagueness and gradation. This would make it more possible for us to
switch between models without simplifying too much, i.e., in such a way that we can preserve the
details.
Another research question i : Can we really handle gradation as such? The problem with fuzzy
set theory and related formal models is that it presupposes that we are able to quantify exactly to what
degree each given point does or does not belong to the object. For example, you would have to say
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that a point on a hillside is 35% part of the hilland that is far-fetched. There are situations where you
can do that, but it rarely works so nicely.
7. Helen Couclelis: Perception and Visualization
Helen Couclelis addressed the theme of Cognition and Re-Presentation. She began with two issues
drawn from the position papers of Anthony Chemero and Violet Gray: the challenge of anti-
representationalism, and the question of the ontological status of discrete versus continuous models
of space. Taking a mildly anti-representationalist stance herself, she put forward three propositions:
(a) there is a duality between fields and objects, (b) this duality holds for both space and time, and (c)
there exist principles for helping us to determine the appropriate representation (field- or object-
based) in different contexts. The first point has its roots in the traditional debate in the history of
science between atomistic ontology, which favors the primacy of objects (there are things in the
world; things have properties), and the plenum ontology, which favors the primacy of fields (there
are fields and properties in the world; the relatively stable spatio emporal clusters of properties are
the things). The latter gives rise to the minimum assumption one can make about the re l world that
is compatible with science, namely, that the real worldis the universe of potentially observable
characteristics (Zeigler, 1976). Thus the plenum ontology may be preferred on epistemological
grounds as more parsimonious.
Couclelis then argued that the fields/objects distinction holds for time as well as space. Clock
orientation treats time as a plenum of instants at which observations can be made, whereas vent
orientation views time as made up of individual events identifiable through observation. Thus we may
set up a time-space correspondence between, r sp ctively, instants and points, durations and
fields, events and objects, and view spatiotemporal phenomena consistently from either the atomic
or the plenum perspective. Accepting that neither kind of representation is ontologically superior to
the other requires us to spell out criteria for determining the appropriate one in each case. Couclelis
suggested that the three main criteria should be the empirical nature of the relevant variables, the
mode of observation, and user purpose.
8. Roberto Casati: Fields, Maps and Semantics
The linguist Leonard Talmy makes a distinction between two classes of linguistic features. Open class
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features change rather easily, whereas closed class features are relatively stable over time. The open
class features include the lexicon, above all nouns. The closed class features include syntactic
elements such as prepositions. Each open class is characterized by the fact that it can change relatively
fast over time, while each closed class acquires or loses items at a relatively slower pace. Thus it is
very easy to add new nouns into a language; rather difficult to add new prepositions. (Compare, for
instance, the difference between the terms computer and betwixt.) Talmy’ s hypothesis is that this
distinction reflects two different cognitive functions encoded in language. Words in the open class
reflect lexical, specific, marginal classifications; words in the closed class express syntactic, general,
core functions. Expressed another way: Closed class features represent formal or structural features
of the world as we cognize it, open class features represent content or matter. This distinction
between these two types of functions explains the stability of closed class words.
If we generalize this thesis, we might say that grammar encodes the ontological commitments of
cognition. For instance the subject/predicate distinction expresses a commitment to the
object/property distinction:
• This apple is red
• *This red is apple
Another example is given by the closed class of suffixes, such as walk-s, walk-ed, etc., which can
express time, tense, ag nt. One can compare the difference between two types of words within a
single sentence:
• John moved across (the room/the ocean)
• *John moved across (the doughnut, the sphere)
Room and doughnut encode fine-grained and marginal information about shapes and sizes, cross
encodes core information. Thus if language is to serve as a guide to cognition’ s ontol ical
commitments, then we ought to look primarily at the syntax rather than at the lexicon in order to
understand the core, structuring commitments in our ontology. Thus we will not make much headway
in our present text with a study of the different meanings of a noun like field. On the other hand, we
can find in language structural, ore representations of field-like phenomena and of the field-object
contrast. These are provided by the well-known distinction between mass and count nouns. Examples
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of mass nouns are: Water, smoke, gold. Examples of count nouns are: Dog, man, wastebasket. Count
nouns, but not mass nouns, take quantifiers:
• Much water
• ?Much dog
• Some water is in the glass
• *Some dog is in the room
• *There is a water in the glass
• A dog is in the room
• *There are some waters in the glass
• Some dogs are in the room





These syntactic distinctions reflect some underlying semantic facts. Mass terms, such as water,
smoke, gold, denote sum-individuals that are cumulative and dissective. Count nouns, such as dog,
man, wastebasket denote individual objects; they are used for identification and re-identification. This
is why you cannot ask “How many waters? but you can ask “How many dogs?”
The underlying difference can be expressed in terms of part/whole relationships. Mass entities are
dissective: very part of a quantity of water (down to a certain size) is a quantity of water; but not
every part of a dog is a dog. If we choose, as a framework, the axiomatic part/whole theory and
predicate calculus, we can express the difference by saying that for any property R, R is dissective
whenever the following holds:
Rx à (y)(Pyx à Ry)
If x has the property R, then every y which is part of x also has the property y. Fields are
dissective entities in this sense. Thus every part of a field is a field.
The analogy between mass-like entities and fields breaks down, on the other hand, at certain
points:
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• Dissectivity holds nontrivially for uniform fields.
• Dissectivity holds (more trivially) for some mereologized or spatialized properties of some
nonuniform fields (fields having nonzero curvature at all points).
• Dissectivity holds trivially for certain very general properties of fields (e.g., being a part of
a field; but this is not a problem for fields only).
9. Berit Brogaard: Fields, Objects and Dependence Relations
In discussions of the ontology of fields the question naturally arises as to what the ontological status
of fields and objects is. How are fields and objects ontologically related to each other? If we were to
follow in rigorous fashion the exact sciences, especially physics, we would probably claim that fields
belong to the absolutely most fundamental level of reality. Common-sense objects such as chairs,
tables, human beings, lakes, mountains, landscapes and so forth, would then not exist unless there
existed a reality with a micro-structure in the form of a net of fields. In fact, it could be claimed that
strictly speaking bits of matter such as atoms and molecules are, at some more fundamental lev l,
much more field-like than object-like. But what about geographic fields? Does the nature of
geographic fields resemble the nature of physical fields? And does the nature of geographic objects
resemble the nature of objects at smaller scales, including dogs and cats, atoms and molecules? And
does the existence of geographic fields actually presuppose the existence of geographic objects, or
is it the other way around?
What we are here concerned with is something that could be called ntologi  dependence. Th
question of ontological dependence may be formulated as follows: given two entities a and b, (i) can
a exist if b does not exist, and (ii) can b exist if a does not exist? We say that we have (one-sided)
ontological dependence whenever an entity a cannot exist unless b exists. Such ontological
dependence we find everywhere in reality. A particular smile cannot exist unless a particular face
exists and so forth. We are here talking, in fact, about what we might call rigid ontological
dependence, because we are not addressing the dependence relationship between ny smile and any
face, but rather a certain quite specific relation which pertains between these two individual entities
a and b here and now. The question of whether smiles in general are ontologically dependent on faces
in general is a different one (though one that is also to be answered in the positive). Here, we are
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concerned with whether any entity of a given kind F is ontologically dependent on some entity of
another kind G. The latter kind of dependence we might call generic dependence.
Perhaps we can better illustrate the difference between the two kinds of dependence with the
following example. The event of my birth is rigidly dependent on the existence of a human being; but
since not all human beings have human parents (if we take evolution into consideration) we cannot
say that a similar generic dependence relationship holds for all human beings. We can formulate the
two forms of ontological dependence in the following way (see Simons 1987, p. 297):
Rigid Dependence:
a is rigidly dependent on b: it is necessarily the case that if a exists then b exists and b’ s
existence is not necessary.
Generic Dependence:
every individual of the kind F is generically dependent on an individual of kind G: give  any
x that is F, x exists only if there is an individual, different from x, which is a G.
We can now return to the question of whether either fields are ontologically dependent on objects
or objects are ontologically dependent on fields. Since we are talking about geographic fields, let us
consider a few examples of such. First, let us consider a field such as population density. I  is clear
that a field of this kind is an extrapolation of the densities 1 or 0 wh ch characterize certain small
regions of space at each given instant. If a correspondingly small spatial area is occupied by an
individual, then the value is 1 and if it is not, then the value is 0. From this it follows that a particular
population density is rigidly dependent on a particular group of people within a given region. But the
population density is also dependent on the region of space in question. While the individuals
contributing to the population density are material objects, the region of space within which they are
located is more like a field. It is within this spatial region that values are attributed to spatial points
at given times.
Another simple example is that of the salt-concentration of a lake. Here both the lake in the form
of a region of space and the distribution of salt have the character of a field. Although th  salt-
concentration can only be measured at certain spatial points (or perhaps also at certain space-time-
points, if time is taken into consideration), the measurement does not consist in an act of counting,
as in the case of a population density, but rather in a direct measurement of the values of a field that
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already exists. Of course, since salt-concentration is an attribute of the lake which itself is rigidly
dependent on its particular composition of water, plants, animals and so forth, salt-concentration is
not ontologically primary. It is itself dependent on other, lower-level phenomena.
Thus, we have here at least two different kinds of geographic fields, namely (1) fields that are
rigidly dependent on objects within a field (e.g., population density), and (2) fields that are thems lves
rigidly dependent on fields (e.g., the salt concentration of a lake). The latter kind of geographic field
also includes fields such as the elevation in a given spatial region, where the elevation can be seen to
exist independently of our measurements as an attribute of the surface of the Earth, or more precisely,
of a certain portion of the Earth (on a fiat object, in Barry Smith’ s terms: see Smith 1995). Let us
call the former kind of fields object fields and the latter continuity fields. The relationship of
ontological dependence is different in the two cases:
Object fields: A particular object field (e.g., population density) is rigidly dependent on the
distribution of discrete objects (the population) within a given spatial region, which again is rigidly
dependent on the particular distributed individuals.
Continuity Fields: A particular continuity field (e.g., the measured salt-concentration) is rigidly
dependent on the existence of a (broadly) continuous field (the salt spread through the lake).
10. Selected Breakout Group Discussions
10.1 Parts of Fields
Initial Questions:
• What are the types of fields?
• What are the parts of fields?
• What are the boundaries of and in fields.
• If we think of fields as functions, what are the restrictions on variables which fields must
satisfy?
Types of fields (fields which are dependent on regions or spatial domains):
• The maximum field (for instance, the entire atmosphere).
• A two-dimensional land-area.
• A three-dimensional portion of the entire atmosphere.
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• Physical fields such as a gravitational field or a magnetic field. Th se are causally integrated
fields which do not admit of subdivision or holes.
• Scattered fields
- involving scattered domains (e.g., the temperature over Europe)
- involving the phenomenon of settings or niches—fields with holes, e.g., the fields occupied
by fish in a lake where the temperature varies in such a way that some portions of the
lake are hospitable and some are not.
Casati’ s suggestion:
(a) If x is a field domain and y is a spatial region, then x+y is a field domain.
(b) If x is a field domain and y is a spatial region which is part of x, then x- y is a field domain.
Drop (a) and you will only have closed fields. Drop (b) and you will only have non-gappy fields.
10. 2 What is a Field?
We can have fields of different dimensions, but they are all spatially anchored. Not every collection
of things constitutes a field. We shall divide fields into two kinds:
• those which exist because of variations in some intrinsic measure of value, for example a
gravitational field;
• parasitic fields, for example the density of population (population itself is not a field).
An interesting question is whether or not there can be gaps in a field. In order to answer that
question, we have to consider the following problems:
• zero-value—this means that the point in the field has a value, namely zero.
• null-value—this means that there is no value at this point (not the same as zero-value)
• non-observed value—this is an epistemic problem
• non-observable value—this also is an epistemic problem
• the value at a given point is not relevant—this means that the point is outside of the spatial
domain over which the quantification is made.
There are different interpretations of the so-called null-value: (1) The null-value could correspond
to a gap in the field. And (2) the null-value could be a possible place for a value. For example, if a
location at the sea has a null-value for a field such as the density of a given population, then its value
could be possible rather than actual.
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10.3 Do Fields Exist?
In the plenary session, fields were defined not in commonsensical terms but rather in the technical
sense of a domain or region on which a function is defined: a field is a field of values of this function.
Our question here is whether or not we agree with this view.
The concept of field comes from perception, as in visual field. It also derives from topography
(from real fields e.g., cornfields). Other examples of fields include quantum fields, fields as a
mathematical construct, etc. What drove the mathematical construct of field is the fact that in all of
these cases there is something at every point, some value of a common characteristic.
From Aristotle, is derived the focus on the properties of objects or substances, above all
organisms. Aristotle’s influence meant that this object-orientation dominated for almost two millennia.
Substances are moveable concrete entities that are bounded in space and time. Now, the problem is
to identify the properties of fields.
When it comes to fields in the naive or non-technical sense, like fields of corn, people prefer to
refer to the aggregate rather than to the individual objects. Fields have properties that objects (e.g.,
apples, boulders) do not.
The group pointed out that it is hard to conceptualize a gradient over a point set. People are
better at saying here is a thing and it has these properties, and this may be related to how we think
about objects versus fields. Regular-sized objects are more salient to us, for various reasons: they are
manipulable, they might be edible. They might be predators. Fields are not as important to us as from
an evolutionary perspective as objects are. This problem, of course, is related to the problem of
figure-ground. We see the objects, but not the background or plenum out of which the objects are
extracted.
We conclude by offering elements of a definition of the term field.
• A field is an aggregate of certain items of interest but of a certain minimal scale: the aggregate
should contain many items; it should be substantially larger than the it ms whic  it
comprehends (so that it is the forest which is more salient, rather than the trees it contains).
• A field cannot be an active agent. Some discussion centered on wind as an example of an
active agent which is at the same time a field. Wind is conceptualized as a vector field. Other
forces, too, are commonly conceptualized as fields.
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What can you do with fields?
• differentiate and integrate them,
• extract discrete objects from them,
• extract a function from them, or
• use them to deal with and manipulate more dimensions than would otherwise be possible.
Fields appear to have some useful mapping to the real world. We cannot prove that fields exist.
Indeed, space-time was a field for Einstein; there is no empty space-time in relativity theory.
Using topographic elevation as an example of a field, how do you represent or describe it?
• Cartographic practice uses isolines.
• Naive practice talks about the shape of say, Mt. Desert.
• Using objects to describe the field leads to the result that Mt. Desert is in fact seven
mountains.
With certain fields, such as zone or area of influence for instance, the internal parts may not be
distinguished. There need be no crisp boundary. You cannot reduce such fields to the individual parts.
10.4 Types of Fields
What can we do with fields? How can we think about them? There is a number of terms that we have
not defined: reality, field, object, feature, and so forth. If we want to get a coherent idea about how
we are using such terms, we need to define them. We need a clarification of the foundation, of where
we stand. What we sought to do in this group was to establish an ontology of fields. The concept of
boundary goes hand in hand with that of fields. Different kinds of fields have different kinds of
boundaries. One sort of field will have just gradual changes or no changes at all. Fields have different
textures. One texture is a continuous kind of texture, another is a network kind of texture. The
difference between these two kinds of fields is that the first has a source-point from which everything
flows, while the network kind of structure is more like a tree without a specific source-point. A third
kind of structure has contour-lines. Finally, you have fields that are divided into zones, for instance,
if a planetary system is thought of as a field, then it is divided into zones corresponding to the
separate planets. There are, of course, instances of these four kinds of fields. We can characterize the
four kinds of field as more or less field- or object-like. The first is most field-like, whereas the fourth
is most object-like.
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We suggest that the four kinds of fields are conceptual models. A country in Africa is like an
object, but we can also represent it as a field. The problem, however, is whether or not we call these
conceptual models fields. A person, for example, is an object, but if the person is part of the
population which gives rise to a population density field, then he is represented by a value, rather than
by some object-representation.
What is the purpose of conceptualizing reality? Cognitively, we continually move back and forth
between different conceptual models. All models fail to completely describe reality. But if that is the
case, how do we find the essence of fields? In one sense field representation is just a different name
for function. The domain of the function is a topological space, which means that it is continuous.
We have different data models to represent such functions.
The difficult question, however, is how we discretize fields in order to represent them. How do
we go from a continuous function to discrete entities? How do we indexicalize or instantiate field
representations. How do we anchor field representations to the underlying reality and to the obj cts
which it contains?
A boundary within a field is something that bounds a set. If there is something that lies within a
set (of space-time points, for example) and also outside the set, then it crosses the boundary.
The ontology of fields is close to the ontology of the plenum. Representations of fields do in fact
not stand for fields as such, but for fields that are already made discrete cognitively. The fundamental
reality, in contrast, is a plenum (no delineatory act has occurred); all other fields are based on a
cognitive act of delineation. This means that there are at least two kinds of fields. The fields which
present the plenum transformed as basis for our cognitive actions, and the underlying real physical
entities which can give rise to cognitive, delineated fields. For example, we need a region in order to
determine population density, but we also need discrete entities, which are not, however, treated as
discrete entities in the field-representation.
One thing that makes it difficult to identify the nature of fields is that they are not part of our
common-sense knowledge as such. While we can see a chair or a cat and hear a melody and identify
them as such, we also perceive fields, but in a visual sense, for example, a visual field is merely an
image, an array of light and color. We can measure fields and there are various technical devices by
means of which we can detect them. Yet fields are not constructions of the human mind in that they
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do not have meaning, per se. The boundaries we draw within a field, on the other hand, are products
of our cognitive activity. It seems that such interposed boundaries are fundamental for understanding
that part of reality that is not already divided into discrete entities.
11. Researchable Questions
11.1 Ontological Perspectives on Fields
• Examine whether there is a general-purpose ontology for geographic phenomena and
determine how fields are incorporated into this ontology.
What are the g ographically-relevant ontologies? Can we build a g neral purpose ontology
for geographers (and for those working on, for example, geographic cognition)? How should
fields, including moving fields, flows, be incorporated into this ontology? Are entirely new
types of ontologies for GIS necessary to facilitate this incorporation? What mathematics
would be the necessary to support such an ontology? Consideration of alternative kinds of
mathematics ncluding: classical, intuitionistic, constructive; alternative statistics; alternatives
to Cartesian spaces, non-metric geometries, tolerance geometries.
• When can fields be reduced ontologically to objects?
And when, correlatively, can field-based theories or reasoning systems be reduced to object-
based theories or systems?
• Define the criteria for adopting a fields-based approach vs. an object-based approach.
Is a dense aggregate of points by definition a field? This could lead to research identifying
common properties for those applications or scientific theories which prefer a field ontology
over an object ontology. It could also lead to efforts to understand the linkages between
sciences (and applications) which use a field ontology and those which use an object
ontology.
11.2 Formalization of Fields
• Develop a data model for fields.
Develop a data model and appropriate data structures for fields and field-based meta-data.
• Define a typology of fields.
What would be a complete set of field types? What would be a complete set of field
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representations? What would be a complete typology of field-object relations? Formalization
of the field concepts used in specific domains (e.g., legal, natural resources, planning, or
navigation, population density, Bathymetric problem).
• Formalize field parts v .field boundaries.
What are the types of constituents of fields? Differentiate between field extent and field
boundary. Fields need some extent, but they need not have a (determinate) boundary. A field
without an extent, for example, would be a single point. Are there formal/mathematical
differences between fields in the physical domain and fields, for example in the legal or
political sphere, which are subject to human demarcations? What are the ontological
implications of the Smith-Varzi work on formal interrelations between fiat-based and classical
topology? To what degree does set theory impose an object-based partition and
mereo(topo)logy a field-based view? What sorts of topologies are p ssible where both objects
and fields are included within a single domain?
• Develop a theory of interpolation with respect to fields.
Can the approach employing virtual data sets (Vckovski and Bucher), which implies an
interpolation method, be expanded and further systematized? What are the best criteria for
selecting one interpolation method rather than another?
• Assess the effect of incomplete, incoherent and inconsistent information on fields.
This includes the problem of fusion of different types of information (compare: route
description and polygon description of street map); the problem of fusion of knowledge
gathered from different perspectives; and the problem of how to recognize incompleteness.
• Develop dynamic field-object algebras. Consider how to extend Tomlin’s map algebra
for dynamic fields.
How to apply techniques of pattern recognition and inference of spatio-temporal processes
to fields.
• Define fields for a sphere. Do fields on the sphere have a different ontology?
What are the appropriate formulae for the description of fields on spheres, and what is the
appropriate interpolation method. The relevant mathematics exists, but needs careful
screening to identify what is usable.
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11.3 Operations on Fields
• What operations are possible on fields?
Operations at a high level of abstraction include create, update, extract, compare, etc.
Determine what are the constraints on operations (e.g., interpolation). What are the criteria
for the equivalence of operations? How do these operations differ for materialized fields vs.
fields that are created on the fly?
• Define meta-operations for fields.
A study on meta-operations could include, for instance, research into how we can store and
use information on lineage and data quality relating to fields. This could also include
operations that support field-to-object transformations including uncertainty propagation.
• Construct a field operations library.
What is an organizational metaphor for cataloging field operations? If we are to develop a
library of interoperable algorithms incrementally there has to be a framework to guide and
organize the algorithm development.
• Develop methods for converting between field representations.
What operations are necessary to support transitions from, for example, raster to functional
representations? What methods can be used to assess quantitatively (and qualitatively) the loss
of information from such a conversion? Examine conversions from quantitative fields to
qualitative fields.
• Interoperating models that incorporate fields.
How do we describe operations on fields in such a way that we can combine different
operations on different fields referencing the same underlying space (cf. the mathematical
techniques described in category theory)? What are the conditions for interoperability?
• Develop operations that support identification of objects in fields.
Develop an approach for identifying an object in a field (e.g., through use of thresholding and
statistical methods). Other operations could include multi-summed fields.
• Measurement, measurement models and opportunistic sampling.
Can we construct re-usable models for integrating measurements/samples that are collected
on an “as available” basis (not randomly, not based on criteria such as point of perceptible
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change) to produce an overall model that gains or retains reliability as the available/relevant
universe of measurements changes. In some cases the resulting model gains reliability and/or
precision; in other cases, for example where measurements are time-bound, the odel retains
value despite expiration of some measurements. Note that measurements may come and go,
for example, seasonal fluxes or things that rise and fall with heat. There are many situations
where we want to use the data we can get, but we do not get all the data we would like to
have Environmental issues provide a host of examples (currents or convection in oceans or
air, dispersion problems of all sorts), precise models of geographic features, such as the geoid
or the ocean floor; epidemiology, crime, all sorts of human behavior.
• Consider issues of scale for fields.
How do changes in scale affect fields. Relevant for field-to-object transitions.
• What role do fields play with respect to overlay operations in GIS?
Could we construct layers with non-metric information (route, fuzzy objects) and combine
topological with metric information? What sort of output should this generate (e.g.,
prescriptive plans for action)?
12.4 Cognitive Aspects of Fields
• Perspective switching between field-based and object-based representations.
Examine the role of geographic reference frames with respect to fields. How are people able
to merge perspectives in their heads? There are aspects of spatial and geographic thinking that
humans perform better than computer programs. How to identify, formalize, and integrate
these methods (this could be a central research question for naïve geography)? What are the
heuristics involved? Examine qualitative reasoning involving fields. Study of children’s
understanding of environment/geographic space and of maps.
• Cognitive aspects of field perception and object perception.
What are the situations (tasks) where one or the other is preferred? V ualization of fields.
Cognitive problems pertaining to the predominance of objects over fields e.g., in perception
and in the lexicon. Consider linguistic and software (usability) implications.
• How does the concept of place relate to fields?
Fields and the naive-geographical notion of place; how do we use place to reason spatially?
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How to formalize this notion? How do we understand the fact that one place/field is
contained within another?
• Fields from a cross-cultural perspective.
Study the range of ways in which people solve a problem against the background of different
sorts of constraints (cognitive, environment and cultural; individual-based vs. group-based
strategies).
12. Conclusions
The most central question among the various issues discussed during the Ontology of Fields Meeting
in Bar Harbor was the question of what a geographic field is. Many of the discussions boiled down
to this one central question. A first answer to that question is that a geographic field, like an
electromagnetic field in physics, is an entity which fills a given area in a continuous fashion. However,
although physical and geographic fields resemble one another under this general description, they
differ considerably with respect to their ontological status. While a physical field cannot be reduced
to more fundamental entities, such as particles, most geographic fields seem reducible to objects and
functions on such objects. An example of a geographic field is that of population density. Yet the
population density in a given area is reducible to the distribution of a number of discrete objects.
Thus, it seems that discrete objects are at least in some cases ontologically more fundamental than
fields in geography. In fact, geographic fields are often a special kind of fiat entities insofar as they
are results of acts of human fiat (see, again, Smith 1994). For example, a geographic field such as that
of population density requires that one delineates a certain spatial area as the pertinent region for the
field. Other geographic fields, such as the salt concentration in a lake, are more like physical fields
insofar as the extrapolation made from the measurements on the lake gives rise to a field
representation that represents a physical entity.
In addition to the questions of what a field is, the question was discussed in many of the sessions
as to what a field representation is and what kind of field representation is the best representation of
a given field. This question involves several components. For example, what is the plenum within
which measurements take place, how is the plenum must efficiently divided into sub-regions, what
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Appendix I
Towards an Ontology of Fields
Karen Kemp and and Andrej Vckovsky
Abstract
While philosophers define ontology as a br nch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and
relations of being, within the knowledge representation and reasoning community, a more tractable
definition exists. There, an ontology is a specification of a conceptualization or a definition of the
vocabulary used to represent knowledge. An ontology describes the concepts and relationships that
exist within a specific domain and describes all that can be represented about that domain. An
ontology of fields that explicitly characterizes spatially continuous phenomena in order that they can
be consistently modeled and completely described within spatial databases is needed.
An ontology of fields must be based on a formal definition of fields. We argue that the classical
definition of a field as a function on a domain which is a subset of space-time is accurate, explicit and
expressive, and provides access to the full set of mathematical tools for the characterization of fields.
Thus, we conclude that there is no need for more ontology.




Ontology and Geographic Kinds
Barry Smith and David Mark
Abstract
An ontology of geographic kinds is designed to yield a better understanding of the structure of the
geographic world, and to support the development of geographic information systems that are
conceptually sound. This paper first demonstrates that geographical objects and kinds are not just
larger versions of the everyday objects and kinds previously studied in cognitive science. Geographic
objects are not merely located in space, as are the manipulable objects of able-top space. Rather, they
are tied intrinsically to space, and this means that their spatial boundaries are in many cases the most
salient features for categorization. The ontology presented here will accordingly be based on topology
(the theory of boundary, contact and separation) and on mereology (the theory of extended wholes
and parts). Geographic reality comprehends m soscopic entities, many of which are best viewed as
shadows cast onto the spatial plane by human reasoning and language. Because of this, geographic
categories are much more likely to show cultural differences in category definitions than are the
manipulable objects of table-top space.
Keywords: ontology, mereology, geographic kinds, entity types, GIS
Presented at International Symposium on Spatial Data Handling (SDH’98), Vancouver, Canada,
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